Monday, April 10, 2006

HISTORY OF MORAL THEOLOGY

i. Introduction

Morals are an acquirement - like music, like a foreign language,
like piety, poker, paralysis - no man is born with them.
-- Mark Twain
The question of one’s history is also relevant to the transpersonal world of ideas and cultures and institutions. Where did we come from? Where did these ways of understanding, of living and functioning, come from? Why are we the way we are today? And just as the personal question cannot be avoided, neither can this corporate questioning. At least it can be avoided only at high cost. For to the extent that we do not understand our past, we really do not understand our present, and we are less prepared to intelligently construct our future. So the purpose of this paper is to sketch the broad outlines of the history of our catholic moral theology. We want to try to understand the historical reasons for the way Catholic moral theology has developed and for the way it expresses itself today. We want to see, at least in a general way, the path by which we have come to the present. We want to recognize that foundation on which, of necessity, our future must somehow be constructed.
Studying Moral theology is a daunting challenged. Difficult as the search for moral truth and goodness has been throughout the centuries, the search continues to challenged us even today. Basic understanding of catholic morality is an understanding of its person-oriented approach. Vatican II restored a Christocentric approach based on the life of Jesus. In the scripture we find the words, actions, life and death of Jesus, who is norm of our moral life. This approach to morality begins with the person of Jesus and continues its search for moral truth and goodness in human persons. We are creatures made in the image of God and are called to continue the mission of Jesus.
We hope that this paper will shed light to the most basic ideas on moral theology, its different definitions, its long and eloquent history and the renewal it undertaken. With a hope that by studying moral theology we ourselves may become loving servants of God, striving to live a moral life and so to put on the mind and heart of Jesus, and we know that just like discipleship, this formation of moral character is a lifelong journey. But with strong faith in our hearts that these words not remain as dead letters in a book but a living words disclosing itself in our very lives.


ii. Nature of Moral Theology

A. Definition
· Is that branch of theology which states and explains the laws of human conduct in reference to man’s supernatural destiny, the vision and finition of God. As a science, it investigates the morality of human acts, that is, the moral good and the moral evil, in conduct in relation to man’s ultimate end. It is a practical science because it has to regulate action.[1]
· A field of theology which concerns the moral and ethical demands and requirements imposed by the Gospel for the full realization of holiness and union with Christ. Moral theology establishes the requirements of faith, hope and charity, and more specifically, it determines the rightness or wrongness, goodness or evil of action according to the standards established by the Gospel and the Church. The norms of moral theology are not only those given by reason but also by faith, and it includes in the norm of faith the data given by the Tradition and Magisterium of the Church. The field of moral theology seeks to give a systematic and organized account of the requirements of Christian holiness and the demands of the Christian vocation.[2]
· Is the scientific exposition of human conduct so far as it is directed by reason and faith to the attainment of our supernatural final end.[3]
· Is a branch of theology, the science of God and Divine things. The distinction between natural and supernatural theology rests on a solid foundation. Natural theology is the science of God Himself, in as far as the human mind can by its own efforts reach a definite conclusion about God and His nature: it is always designated by the adjective natural. Theology, without any further modification, is invariably understood to mean supernatural theology, that is, the science of God and Divine things; in as far as it is based on supernatural Revelation. Its subject matter embraces not only God and His essence, but also His actions and His works of salvation and the guidance by which we are led to God, our supernatural end. Consequently, it extends much farther than natural theology; for, though the latter informs us of God's essence and attributes, yet it can tell us nothing about His free works of salvation. The knowledge of all these truths is necessary for every man, at least in its broad outlines, and is acquired by Christian faith. But this is not yet a science. The science of theology demands that the knowledge won through faith, be deepened, expanded, and strengthened, so that the articles of faith be understood and defended by their reasons and be, together with their conclusions, arranged systematically.[4]
· Is essentially a systematic attempt to understand divine revelation in reference to the Christian person’s loving response in faith to God’s salvific invitation.[5]
· Is the theological discipline that studies the moral life and action of Christians. Cath­olic insistence that the human person is an image of God with intellect, free will, and the power of self-determination, the importance of works as well as faith, and the practice of the sacrament of Recon­ciliation have given great importance to morality. Catholic insistence on reason and theology in gener­al contributed to the development of a reflexive, the­matic, and critical study of moral life called moral theology. All Catholics are called to discern and make responsible human judgments, but moral the­ology as a discipline seeks a systematic, coherent, and adequate understanding of all aspects of the moral life and actions of the Christian.[6]
· Is that part of theology which studies in the light of Christian faith and of reason, the guidelines man must follow to attain his final goal.[7]
· Is that part of theology which in the light of revelation and faith lived in the church community, aims to point the way to the full humanization of persons and society in the footsteps of Jesus Christ and His Kingdom.[8]
· Is a particular expression of systematic theology which focuses on the implication of faith for the way we live. As a formal theological discipline, it is concern with God’s revelation of divine love in Jesus and through the spirit as an invitation calling for our response. It regards the response to the initiative of God’s offer of love as the very soul of the moral life.[9]

B. Distinction between Moral theology and Dogmatic Theology
Dogmatic and moral theology together makes up a systematic theology, which treats in logical sequence of the truths of God, about the salvific work of Christ and about creatures as directed to God in Christ.[10]
Dogmatic theology refers to the brief characterization of the treatises on God, Christ, grace, the sacraments, etc., pre­sented in the dogmatic manuals of Catholic theology between the two Vatican councils. The manuals practice the “regressive” method in their argumentation and exposition. This en­tails beginning from present-day teaching of the ecclesiastical Magisterium and then showing how this doctrine was originally expressed in Scripture and then developed in the patristic and medieval expressions of Catholic faith. The sources are read in the light of what is taught and believed in the church of the theologian’s own day. The intended result is an account of the harmonious development by sages down to what is explicit in present-day teaching.[11] More so, Dogmatic Theology specify what we must belief. It is speculative in character, reflecting on the nature of God, of his creatures, and of the new creation in Christ.[12]
On the other hand, moral theology determine how we are to live and what we are regarded to do or not to do because of those beliefs. It is more of a practical science, drawing from the dogmatic truths the consequences for human action and guiding man towards the realization of his final goal.[13]

C. Relation between Moral Theology and Philosophical Ethics
Moral theology and Philosophical Ethics are determinants of human actions, its intentions, objects and circumstances. Philosophical Ethics in its reflection and systematization uses only human sources such as reason and experience while religious ethics uses such as scriptures, tradition and teaching and religious ethics can be Christian, Moslem or Hindu ethics.
Catholic Moral theology since it relies on mediation for coming to know God and what faith requires, it takes seriously not only revelation and tradition but also critical reflection on ongoing human experience as well.
Ethics is closely related to moral theology or moral philosophy, which also endeavors to establish guiding principles and rules for man’s moral life. But in contradistinction to moral theology, the latter excludes the positive revelation of the Old and New Testament as source of its moral knowledge and guidance. Moral philosophy draws its insights only from reason and from that general revelation which is granted to every man by the universal presence of the divine Spirit. To find another distinction in the fact that moral theology would deal with the supernatural final goal of man and moral philosophy with a merely natural goal does not seem justified. In the concrete order of salvation there exists only one final goal common to all mankind, which derives from the sovereignty of Christ over our present world. This is the unequivocal teaching of Vatican II. The Council makes it a point to express repeatedly and forcefully its conviction that “the ultimate vocation of man is in fact one” (GS 22) and that “all men are called to one and the same goal, namely, God Himself” (GS 24; NA 1). Of course, the insight into man’s final end will be of a different character in moral philosophy and in moral theology. Since the latter is not only aided by reason and general revelation but also by the positive revelation of God in the Scriptures and in Christ, it is to be expected that its insights into the final goal are deeper and more complete.[14]
Moral theology is at once distinct from and comprehensive than ethics. It is distinct from ethics since ethics considers what is right and wrong about any given action on the basis of human reason unaided by revelation, where moral theology assumes a divine revelation as the basis of its analysis of conduct. What makes moral theology more comprehensive than ethics is that, in addition to divine revelation; moral theology draws upon ecclesiastical tradition and the reality of a supernatural order for its account and direction of behavior. Thus moral theology is concerned with conduct which may be rationally analyzed and guided, but conduct understood and interpreted always in the context of a divine revelation, an ecclesiastical tradition, and a supernatural order. Ethics is the handmaid of moral theology.[15]
Moral philosophy, or philosophical ethics, can reflect quite well on the nature of the moral life and what constitutes right and wrong behavior with­out any reference whatsoever to God’s revelation and to Christian beliefs. Moral theology, however, as a “theological” discipline cannot. In short, Christian moral theology wants to know what difference being a Christian believer makes fur the way we live our lives. Therefore, it is interested in the implications of Christian faith for the sorts of persons we ought to be (this is often called the ethics of being” or “character ethics”) and the sorts of actions we ought to perform (this may also be called “the ethics of doing”). Both being and doing, or character and action, constitute interdependent concerns and must be taken together in any complete project of moral theology. The sort of persons one is depends to a great extent upon the sorts of decisions and actions one has taken, and conversely, the sorts of decisions and actions which one has taken depend in part upon the sort of person one is.[16]

D. Division of Moral Theology
Moral theology is divided into a general and a special part. General moral theology treats of the general conditions and qualities with which every action must be endowed in order that it may contribute to man’s final goal. It deals with the ultimate end of man; with the divine, natural and human law as the objective norms of morality; with conscience as the subjective norm; with the realization of the moral value in human acts; with sins as morally bad actions; with conversion, virtues, and man’s perfection in holiness.
Special moral theology treats of human behavior in the different spheres and situations of human life. It is subdivided in two main parts. The first part deals with man’s responsibility in the religious realm, the second part with his respon­sibility towards the created world. Part one on the religious realm discusses the divine virtues of faith, hope, and charity, and the different forms of worship. Part two on the created world treats of the virtues of fraternal love and of justice; community life in family, state, and Church; bodily life and health; sexuality, marriage, and virginity; work and property; truth, fidelity, and honor.[17]


iii. Historical Survey OF MORAL Theology

A. The Moral Message in the Old Testament[18]
The Israelites were given a law by God through revelation, the core of which is the Mosaic Law. We call it the Old Law. This law, too, has a supernatural imprint, not only in the sense that it gives an insight of a relatively clear character into the ultimate end and into the natural moral law, and that it confirms Israel’s juridical and ceremonial law by divine authority, but also in the sense of substantially supernatural revelations and laws. This is most clearly seen in those requirements of the moral law which arise from the expectation of the Messiah and God’s preparation of the people for the coming of Christ. This concerns especially the virtues of faith, penance, confidence, hope, and divine love. Yet also the ceremonial laws have a certain relation to the mystery of Christ. The immediate designation of the cult of the OT is the perpetual memorial of the covenant between Yahweh and Israel, his people. But the noblest function of the many liturgical prescriptions was to symbolize in advance the Christian mystery, to awaken the yearning for the promised Messiah, and to excite a sense of sin and of need for the redemption which Christ was to bring.
For this reason, i.e. because the Old Law was essentially a preparation, it was destined to lose its binding force (Rom 7:1-6; Gal 2:19). It had only the task of an educator for the new covenant in Christ (Gal 3:24-26). Therefore it lost its reason of existence with the coming of Christ and came to an end (Rom 10:4). The Council of the Apostles at Jerusalem confirms this fact (Acts 15:7-11, 280. We can consider the beginning of the New Testament with the death of Christ as the point of time at which the Old Law was dissolved (“Where a will is involved, the death of the one who made it must be established,” Heb 9:16).
Hence in the sphere of New Testament morality the Old Law no longer binds us. Yet this does not mean, as already explained on other occasions, that everything which is in the Old Testament has ceased to bind. The theory that the Ten Com­mandments of the Old Testament are of no concern to Christians was very firmly rejected at the Council of Trent (DS 1569). The Old Testament legislation gave the natural moral law binding force for the Israelites under an additional title. This, title ceases, but the other—human nature—remains. And moreover, the New Testament imposes the natural obligations anew, and Christ wills to have them fulfilled with greater purity than they were fulfilled in the old covenant.

B. The Moral Message in the New Testament[19]
The existence of a moral law in the New Testament was denied by some of the Reformers, who misinterpreted the texts about the freedom of Christians (cf. Gal 5:1) by a false mysticism setting itself above the law. Hence the Council of Trent had to define that other things besides faith are commanded in the gospel (DS 1569) and that Christ our Redeemer is also a law­giver (1) 8 1571). In the chapter on the origin of Christian ethics it has already been shown that Christ and the early, Church, Paul not excluded, in fact know and teach moral commandments and that they accept the existence of a moral law also for Christians. It suffices in this context to refer to the pertinent paragraphs there.
The basic significance of New Testament revelation for the moral law consists on the one hand (formaliter tantum) in this that it deepens the insight into the natural law, gives a much more perfect understanding of the true essence of the law, endows man with a clear knowledge of his final goal and, not in the last instance, purifies and completes the motives of the moral endeavour. On the other hand (formaliter simul et materialiter), God’s salvific act in Christ bestows upon mankind new sources of grace of a substantially supernatural character, from which correspondingly new moral obligation result. These sources are the sacrifice of the Mass and the other sacraments and above all the person of Christ himself. In him the expectations of the old covenant are fulfilled. Christ as the divine messenger and the Son of God claims our faith, our love, a life in fellowship and communion with him.
On principle, the law of the new covenant holds for all men, because the graces it offers and the insights it gives are intended for all mankind. “Go and make disciples of all nations teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you” (Mt 28:190. This is obvious also from the contents of the moral demands of the New Testament and from the intentions of those who formulated them. The New Testament commandments are not merely meant for a particular time and nation but for all men at all times and in all places. Of course, subjectively a man is only bound to their observance in so far as he has gained sufficient knowledge of them.
The New Law differs from the Old Law, generally speaking, in this that it fulfills and perfects the Mosaic Law. Yet a particularly striking difference and even opposition between the Old and the New Law is found by Paul in the realization that the Mosaic law is an external, written code, whilst the Law of Christ is a law of the Spirit; “for the written code kills, but the Spirit gives life” (2 Cor 3:6). Therefore, Christians are to “serve not under the old written code but in the new life of the Spirit” (Rom 7:6). This leads St. Thomas Aquinas to the conclusion that the fundamental element of the New Law is the grace of the Holy Spirit, whilst the external laws are only given as a secondary element; hence, the New Law is fundamentally an internal law and only in the second instance also a written 1aw. This doctrine of St. Thomas has always belonged to the spiritual teaching of the Church.

C. The Period of the Fathers of the Church (Until 7th Century)[20]
The writing on moral topics in the first 500 years of the Church’s history is fascinating, both because it represents the initial understandings of Christian theology and because it bears so many similarities to the reflections of our own time. From the very beginning a concern with the behavioral implications of the Gospel proclamation manifested itself. The Didache (c. A. D. 75) begins with a portrayal of the "two ways," the way of virtue and the way of evil, and challenges the listener to a deep conversion. But this ethical concern did not result in any comprehensive moral systems, let alone any single, universally accepted system. Rather, the writing of the period was characterized by a desire to respond to the concrete needs of the community in a way that is still authentic to the core of the Christian faith.
Various authors differently handled this dialectic of faith and experience. Clement of Alexandria (d. 216) exhibited a rather optimistic vision of life, a willingness to integrate the Gospel truth with the insights of the pagan world. He viewed pagan wisdom as "so many seeds strewn by the Logos," and thus expected a fundamental continuity between experience and revelation. Clement was not above dealing with concrete issues; at one point he described in detail the typical day of the Christian with its various ethical challenges. But even in such discussions he revealed a humanistic and optimistic perspective.
In contrast, Origen (d. 253) was much more negative. It is true that he was an educated man, in touch with pagan knowledge and willing to make use of it. Indeed, it was Origen who first used the classic concept of the cardinal virtues in Christian theology. But even so, one discerns in his discussions of sin, of human freedom, and of the meaning of salvation a relatively pessimistic view of human life. As a representative in theology of the burgeoning monastic movement, of the concern for "white martyrdom," Origen was much more inclined to dichotomize the life of Christian faith and the life of the world.
A century later a landmark book was written by Ambrose, the Bishop of Milan (d. 397). His De officiis followed the lead of Cicero in both title and area of concern. While contextualizing his reflections with the vision of Christian faith and doctrine, Ambrose addressed himself to the myriad "duties" of the believer. And he sought to articulate these moral responsibilities in a concrete way that presaged the works of casuistry that would flourish 1300 years later. Perhaps we might call Ambrose the first of the Christian casuists.
Most notable of the patristic figures, however, is Ambrose’s disciple, Augustine of Hippo (d. 430). Augustine is a compelling, and at the same time rather confusing, representative of the early Church. Some have called him one of the greatest moral theologians of all time. Others note the negative influence of his rigorist, perhaps subtly Manichean perspective on later Church teaching. All this is debated despite the fact that he never attempted to develop a coherent and inclusive system of moral theory. Instead, Augustine’s style (and it is a characteristic of the era) was to range far and wide across the spectrum of theological concepts and human concerns. He sketched his personal theological vision in his Confessions, he developed his understanding of the world in City of God, and he wrote shorter works on such diverse ethical topics as lying, widowhood, and especially sexual ethics.
If Augustine does not demand our attention because of his systematic approach, he does because of the shape of his thought. He addressed himself to the perennial underlying issues of ethics: the relationship of faith and works, of grace and freedom, of sin and virtue. He focused on the centrality of love in the Christian life. He utilized a rather psychological, introspective, and inductive approach to the development of ethical insight. And in all these ways he revealed himself as a fundamentally modern Christian thinker.
In the history of Christian theology the sixth century marks an important watershed. The Christian faith had emerged from its minority status and had become the commitment of the masses. It had become the officially espoused religion of the state, and its theological vision and pastoral approach had to be appropriately adjusted.
One of the more significant elements of that adjustment was the change in practice as regards the Sacrament of Reconciliation. During the Patristic era this sacrament had been relatively rare. Its use was limited to the confession of truly major sins, lengthy penances were required before absolution, and the penitent was not allowed to return to the sacrament with any frequency. During the sixth century, however, this practice changed. Particularly in Ireland and through the ministry of the Celtic monks, the confession of sin became more private and more frequent, a much more comprehensive variety of sins were submitted to the confessor, and penances began to be fulfilled after absolution. In a word, then, the Sacrament of Reconciliation became much more an ongoing component of the Christian life.
This, however, had immediate implications for moral theology. For it was presumed that the penances should fit the particularities of the sins confessed. Therefore, some systematic reflection on the nature of sin, its varieties, and on the demands of retributive justice was required. Moreover, at this time the level of clerical education was notably low, with the result that priests could not generally be trusted to make unguided judgments in these matters. As a result, there emerged at this time a series of compendiums known as Penitential Books.
These were not really works of theology. Even less were they descriptions of the ideals to be sought in the Christian life. Rather they were simply lists of typical sins along with an indication of the appropriate penance in each case. But despite their modest intent, these books exercised a far-reaching influence on the future of moral theology.
For one thing, the Penitential Books were addressed to priest-confessors. Thus began the rather unhealthy identification of moral theology both with the Sacrament of Penance and with priests. This presumption that moral theology is primarily for priests has survived to our own time, and only recently has it been challenged. Secondly, the very specific purpose of these books inevitably led to the association of moral theology with Christian minimalism. That is, the very existence of lists such as those in the Penitential Books tempted the Christian world to conclude that virtuous and faithful living consisted in the avoidance of the sins mentioned therein and that successful avoidance of these sins justified confidence in one’s moral righteousness. There was, or appeared to be, no reason to "walk the extra mile." Thirdly, the specific association of penance with sin encouraged an approach to Christian forgiveness that emphasized not mercy but justice. Absolution became more a matter of retribution. And thus the focus on the loving kindness of God, while never lost, was quite overshadowed. Finally, the Penitential Books contributed to an emphasis on the importance of the individual act, an emphasis that remains today. We shall consider this emphasis in great detail in this book, and we shall attempt to downplay it by locating the act in its broader context. But before any of that, it is important to note how this act orientation, the urge to fragment the Christian life into its smallest possible components, developed. And the Penitential Books played a significant role in that development.

D. The Middle Ages (7Th to 13th Century)[21]
Shortly after the passing of the first millennium, the character of European culture underwent a significant change, and that change had considerable influence on the progress of moral theology. This was the era of the rise of the great European universities. Centers of learning proliferated and the quality of education greatly improved. It was still Catholic Europe of course, and thus theology held a central place in these new universities. But if theology influenced the academic scene, it is also true that the academic world influenced theology.
Systematic thought was the order of the day; the urge was to integrate, summarize, and logically articulate. This approach became the approach of theology as well. It was the era of the Summas, those great constructs of systematic theology, and those attempts to proclaim the Gospel in a philosophically consistent and logically compelling manner. And among those who contributed to this development, two in particular deserve our attention.
One was the Franciscan, Bonaventure (d. 1274). His fundamental commitment was still to the Platonic tradition which had prevailed in the centuries before, and out of that perspective he developed a brilliant synthesis of Christian theology and morality. For Bonaventure, the central characteristic of people was their will, their power to decide and to act.
The intellect, while extremely important, was in the order of means, a tool to be used for action. Indeed, Bonaventure declared that the purpose of all theology was "not merely to serve contemplation, but also to make us holy. In fact its first purpose is to make us holy." And even in his discussion of the intellect he emphasized the "practical intellect" as our highest achievement.
Bonaventure had no separate presentation of moral theology; that was not the style in the age of the Summas. But for the reasons mentioned above, his theological synthesis was an amiable contribution to later reflections on that reality.
The other figure was Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274). Aquinas, the Dominican, holds unparalleled fame in Catholic theology, and for many wise reasons. In his time the writings of Aristotle were being rediscovered; and it was Aquinas who especially demonstrated the aptness of that philosophy for the articulation of Christian theology. For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, humans were preeminently intellectual beings, rational animals. And their highest achievement was precisely that contemplation which Bonaventure played down. Theology was for understanding; it was a pure science in the service of pure truth. It is clear, then, that Aquinas would have no place for a separate science of moral theology. The isolation of behavior from truth was precisely what he opposed. But to say this is not to say that he was disinterested in ethical questions. By no means.
On the one hand, the method espoused by Aquinas led surely to an attempt to understand the Christian life; our understanding of ourselves and of our behavior was an important component of our attempt to understand God. And on the other hand, once the Gospel was heard and understood, it was clear that a responsive life-style was demanded. So Aquinas was quite willing to discuss the specifics of that life-style. Indeed, the whole Pars Secunda of his Summa Theologiae is a sort of treatise on moral theology, dealing first with general concepts (I-II) and then with specific ethical topics (II-II). But for our purposes the important point is that these ethical discussions were incorporated into the overall synthesis of Christian theology and not isolated in any way.
To a certain extent this integration of dogmatics and ethics characteristic of both Aquinas and Bonaventure is also characteristic of the whole of the High Middle Ages. There was no compartmentalizing of theological components, no isolating of faith and action, no dichotomizing of grace and nature. Reality was viewed holistically, theology was developed holistically. And in writings such as the Summas, this integrating perspective yielded a rich and clearly contextualized moral theology.

E. The Age of Humanism (13th to 18th Century)[22]
Shortly after the deaths of Aquinas and Bonaventure, there began a process of change and development which can hardly be overestimated in its influence on moral theology. The first step in the process was marked by two highly significant changes in the theological situation.
On the one hand, the philosophical context shifted radically. The high Scholasticism of the thirteenth century devolved, in the fourteenth, into a nominalistic vision of reality. The conviction that the human person was capable of distilling concepts, universal notions that capture and represent the real essence of things, was replaced by a skepticism in this regard. Philosophers such as Ockham (d. 1349) became convinced that there were no such essences, that the human person did not achieve universal concepts. Rather it was the uniqueness of each existing thing that was the object of human intellectual attention. The only way in which one could move beyond the unique existent was by a somewhat arbitrary process of "collection." Nominalists willingly conceded that it was common practice to grant various groupings of objects a general and inclusive name. But in their judgment these names were simply that and nothing more. There is no essence or nature "tree." We simply group various unique existing things and call them "trees." For nominalists reality is fundamentally discontinuous.
This philosophical development was ethically important because it rendered useless the attempt to discuss the nature of the Christian life and to predict intrinsically good or intrinsically bad acts. Where there is utter uniqueness there is no tool of predictability. And where that tool is lacking, there can ultimately be no useful objective component to ethical decision-making. In fact, the consequence of a nominalist epistemology is complete ethical individualism. My situation is utterly unique, and I am an utterly unique person. Hence, only I can judge what I must do; and even I can only judge in the midst of the experience.
If society finds itself threatened by this individualism, it has only one alternative: the arbitrary imposition of law. Society cannot attempt to impose demonstrably rational guides for action. For these presume the existence of universals and essences. So it can only have recourse to power, to the naked demand for conformity. Thus, if the immediate consequence of nominalism is individualism, its eventual consequence is legalism.
The other highly significant change in the theological situation of the time was economic. This was the period in which medieval feudalism was giving way to an emerging structure of middle-class commerce. The exchange of goods and services greatly increased, individual mobility became more common, and thus a quantity and variety of relationships among strangers became necessary. In this situation, it was no longer sufficient to appeal to the duties of fraternity to justify correct behavior. Instead, it became necessary to articulate the precise demands of justice, to specify with great accuracy what one is due. As a result, traditional Christian virtues such as love, fidelity, and piety came to be neglected as justice and equity were emphasized. And a certain moral minimalism was inevitable.
These two developments, the philosophical and the commercial, combined to give fifteenth-century morality a peculiar flavor. Law was celebrated as central to moral thinking and living, and was seen as a tool for expressing the necessary minimum, for establishing rights and duties in such a way as to regulate the rapidly multiplying relationships within the European community. There was a pragmatic and utilitarian tone that, while somehow surprising, is in retrospect completely understandable.
Into this situation, then, came one of the most influential figures in the history of Christendom: Martin Luther (1483-1546). Luther the monk, Luther the Christian tortured by personal feelings of inadequacy and sinfulness, Luther the student of St. Paul. This Martin Luther entered a Christian situation that was far removed from the Gospel ideal. The situation emphasized justice, and Luther was convinced that no one is just. The situation emphasized the law, and Luther shared Paul’s distrust of law. The situation focused on minimums, and Luther felt driven to perfection. The situation cherished good works, and Luther placed his trust in faith.
We are, of course, sketching with a broad-brush event that included innumerable subtleties. But for our purposes it may suffice to become conscious of the polarities. For they indicate the shape of the response to Luther. When the Church finally formulated its Counter-Reformation in the Council of Trent, it was faced with a full-scale rebellion. Much of Europe had been lost to the Church, and the first priority was to establish the lines of demarcation with clarity. The placement of those lines has influenced moral theology down to our own times.
In a situation of such total conflict the council, and the Church, may be forgiven for an overwhelming emphasis upon the practicalities of behavior. This was not the time for leisurely theological or philosophical discussions; like any time of war, it left little time for speculation. Action was required; unanimity and uniformity were necessities. Thus the response of the council had those characteristics.
For one thing seminaries were established. For the first time in the history of the Church a clear and formal system for the education of clergy was developed. Clergy were to be isolated from the crises and turbulence of the day. They were to be provided with clear and concise directions for their ministry. They were to be inculcated with loyalty and a willingness to obey.
For another thing, the kind of education provided seminarians was to emphasize the behavior necessary for the Catholic. It was important to know what to do, and those areas of theology which indicated the proper action were to be highlighted. And thus, again for the first time in the history of the Church, the separate science of moral theology emerged. No longer was it merely a matter of reflecting on the truths of the faith and, in the course of this, taking note of their behavioral implications. Now it was a matter of directly and extensively specifying the requirements of the Christian life.
For a third thing, when this separate moral theology emerged, it took on a specific character. It, too, was expected to emphasize the concrete, the objective, the necessary and required. And thus, as moral theology be-came separated from its roots in dogmatic theology, it became affiliated with that other science dedicated to these qualities, namely canon law. It was the law that indicated most clearly what one must do; and so it was completely reasonable to graft moral theology onto law, to give them the intimacy of sister sciences. This integration was done so completely and so successfully that, even to our day, textbooks of Christian ethics have borne the title Theologia moralis ad normam juris canonici (Moral theology according to the norm of canon law).
The consolidation of the post-Reformation period did not, of course, bring to an end the questioning that has always characterized moral theology. But it did establish the terms in which that questioning took place. Throughout the centuries after Luther, the issue was predominantly one of the precise meaning of the law. What, exactly, is the right thing to do? What is the minimum expected of the Catholic Christian? How can one permit a certain amount of legitimate Christian freedom while at the same time protecting the supremacy of objective moral demand? What is the proper response to a situation in which the demands of the law are in doubt?
Questions such as these were hotly debated by moralists. At the one extreme a Jansenist rigorism was proposed; at the other (and partly in reaction to Jansenism), a laxist preoccupation with freedom. And all these debates eventually led to the development of a variety of moral systems for the responsible resolution of ethical doubts. Of these systems, perhaps the best known today is "probabilism," the system which held that when there is a genuine division of expert opinion on a specific moral issue—and therefore two probable (reasonable) opinions—one may feel free to follow the more lenient opinion. And this even if only a minority of the experts holds the lenient opinion.
One of the major figures in the debates of the time was Alphonsus Liguori (1696—1787). Alphonsus is notable in the history of moral theology not precisely because he was creative or innovative, but rather because he was a prudent man, able to formulate balanced, reasonable, and humane opinions. In the midst of a morass of disagreements, with zealots on all questions, Alphonsus was a beacon of reason, of common sense, in the eighteenth century. Although he actually supported "equiprobabilism," a slightly stricter alternative to probabilism, his commitment to prudent moderation made him a model for moral theology up until the very recent past.
Alphonsus is also significant because his moral method, noting the various opinions and then seeking to walk a prudent middle course, modeled an ethical style that has perjured. That style is exemplified in the "manuals," textbooks which summarize the prudent and reasonable position on the various issues of the time. Manuals were largely designed for the use of seminarians, and they were clearly oriented toward the application of moral theology in the confessional. But while they were in some ways conservative documents, greatly dependent upon arguments from authority, they were also somehow pastoral. For given the legalistic premise that prevailed, there was a great tendency to multiply laws to the point of completely eliminating the reality of Christian freedom. In this context, manuals often functioned as voices of reason, guiding the confessor away from the extremes and toward the moderate position. They prevented the priests of the day from arbitrarily imposing unreasonable demands on their people and instead protected a certain gentle and patient spirit in moral theology.
Still, one could hardly celebrate the manuals as paradigms of profound moral theology. They were simply too much creatures of their own philosophical, theological, and cultural milieu for that. And so eventually a move away from the manuals was to be expected, a fundamental renewal of moral theology was required.

F. The Modern Epoch (18th to 20 Century)[23]
When that renewal of moral theology began, it had its start at the University of Tubingen, in Germany. Perhaps the first significant figure in the renewal was John Michael Sailer, Bishop of Ratisbon (1750-1832). He was soon followed by John Baptist Hirscher (1788—1865). These two figures, and the school they represented, were greatly influenced by the revival of scriptural studies in Germany. And in light of those new scriptural insights they began to question not specific moral teachings, but rather the whole style of moral theology. They issued a call for a more kerygmatic moral teaching, with emphasis upon the inner realities of conversion and discipleship. They pointed out the essential link between Christian morality and Christian spirituality. They participated in the revival of interest in the Fathers of the Church, and particularly Augustine. Noticing patristic themes that resonated with the science of psychology developing in northern Europe, they called for increased psychological sensitivity in moral theology. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, they demanded a reunification of moral theology and dogmatic theology; they sought to reestablish the truly theological roots of Christian ethics.
This renewal did not achieve hegemony with any speed. Such political realities as the First Vatican Council, the Syllabus of Errors, and the mood of suspicion that separated Italians and Germans made this impossible. But it did continue, and at a slow and painful rate it developed. In the early years of this century theologians continued to develop their ideas of moral theology. Such individuals as Joseph Mausbach (1861-1931) and Th. Steinbuchel (1888-1949) made significant contributions. And when German theologians Bernard Haring (1912-1998 ) and Josef Fuchs (1912-) assumed their posts at two Roman universities (the Alphonsianum and the Gregorian, respectively) the widespread dissemination of these ideas was assured.

iv. Renewal of Moral Theology

A. Features of the Renewal of Moral Theology
Vatican II called for renewal of all areas of the church, including moral theology. The direction for renewal is to retrieve Jesus as the norm of the moral life and to form moral character, a daunting task. Scriptures and the Traditions of the church are to ground moral teachings and the study of moral theologians. Theologians strive to meet this challenge as they study and apply the church’s teachings to our world with its numerous and complex moral problems. Each of us is also challenged to find ways consistent with scripture and tradition, to apply our belief and moral convictions.
To understand the recent renewal of theology one must understand the climate of society and the church prior to Vatican II. The 1960’s were filled with an atmosphere of turmoil and excitement. in the United States there was turmoil in the form of protests against the Vietnam War and marches and demonstrations aimed at achieving civil rights for all. There was excitement in the hopes and efforts to create new structures of justice, freedom, and peace for all citizens. Something new was being horn, just as something old seemed to he passing away.
Morally, the motto became “What fulfills and makes a person happy is what is right.” However, with emphasis on personal morality, this “right” was not balanced with objective morality represented by laws and authority. Law and authority were part of the “establishment” being rejected. Given the force of widespread protests, major institutions of leadership were compelled to evaluate their entire system and offer new or revised products and services. The climate for a “new order” was in the air.
In the midst of this turmoil and excitement in Western countries, Pope John XXIII opened Vatican II in 1963. With this ecumenical council, the pope ushered in a massive renewal of the Roman Cath­olic Church. For the first time in the church’s history, three thousand bishops from all over the world were able to attend sessions with periti (experts in theology) for a two-year period. There was excite­ment among the delegates just as there was in society. The pope and bishops, with the help of their theological advisors, opened the dusty windows of the church to the world and let in fresh air.[24]
To say that great changes have occurred in Catholic moral theology since Vatican II is a commonplace. As a result of the council, the manuals were abandoned as standard texts for teaching moral theology and with that at least three major changes occurred: (1) a shift in focus. (2) a shift in worldview (3) a shift in method.[25]
One of the criticisms directed against the manuals; that they represent an understanding of moral theology that us too narrow in scope and in purpose. Moral theology needed to be transformed from a discipline for confessors to one of a critical understanding of faith for Christian living. For this to happen, moral theology would have to be integrated with the great mysteries of faith. Another criticism of the manuals is that their so-called “moral theology” was not “theology’” at all. It could more accurately be described as moral philosophy pursued by believers. The content of the manuals was too sepa­rated from the great mysteries of faith to be theological, and scripture appeared in the form of random quotations to support positions arrived at on the basis of philosophy. The moral reflection in the manuals was primarily rational reflection on human nature. Faith did net seem to make a difference.
The renewal of moral theology has radically changed the manualist focus of an isolated, individualistic, act-centered, and sin-oriented approach to morality and the moral life. The primary tenet of the renewal of moral theology has been that morality worthy of the modifier “Christian” ought to be integrated with revelation and the great mysteries of faith. The efforts at renewing moral theology try to take seriously the claim of Gaudium et Spes that “Faith throws a new light on everything. manifests God’s design for man’s rural vocation, and thus directs the mind to solutions that are fully human” (n. 11).
The possibility of integrating moral theology with scripture and the great mysteries of faith was prepared for by a renewed interest in biblical studies. Remote inspiration came from Leo XIII with his encyclical Providentissimus Deus (1893) which declared scripture the ‘soul of theology. In 1943 Pius XII issued Divino Afflante Spiritu to open the way for Catholic scholars to take critical approaches to the biblical text this gave a powerful boost to all of theology, not just to the study of the Bible. It opened the way for the council’s decree on revelation, Dei Verbum, to declare that “Sacred theology rests on the written word of God, together with sacred tradition as its primary and perpetual foundation… The study of the sacred page is, as it were, the soul of sacred theology” (n. 24).
In short then, the renewed moral theology, rooted in the Bible and integrated with the great mysteries of faith, focuses on the total human vocation of living in response to God’s self-communication to us in creation in history, and most fully in Jesus. As such, moral theology deals that God’s offer of divine love enables us to be and to do. In this renewed morality, values arc primary; laws are secondary. Use fundamental value is the sacred value of persons as the image of God. By promoting and protecting whatever befits the well being of persons we are responding to the presence of God in our midst. In this way, the moral life becomes largely the matter of promoting positive human relationships which allow the full potential of ones own and another’s gifts to flourish. With its attention to relationships and responsibility, our renewed moral theology is much more socially conscious than the individualistic morality of the manuals.
In the renewed moral theology, the act-centered questions of the ethics of doing, “What am I doing?” is no longer enough to cover the scope of morality. We must also ask from the ethics of being. “What is my doing doing to me?” What sort of person am I becoming?” These call for much greater attention to character and virtue than the manuals gave. The renewed view of moral theology sees the moral life reflected more in the quality of our char­acter and our relationships than in isolated actions we may do. Living moral is a matter of appropriating the values which promote positive moral char­acter and life-giving human relationships. As such the moral life is a matter of process of conversion so that who we are and what we do becomes more and more a response to divine love.
Perhaps the most important shift in theology which affects the entire enterprise of contemporary moral theology is the shift in ways of looking at the world. Since the roots of moral misunderstanding and disagreement often lie in a conflict of worldviews, we need to give a little more attention to what is entailed in this shift than we are giving to the other two.
Bernard Lonergan characterizes this shift from the old theology to the new as a move away from a “classicist” worldview to one marked by “historical consciousness”. These movements called into question the great conceptual systems of well-defined essences expressed in the abstract - uni­versal concepts. The impacts of these movements and the shift in the worldviews have been strongly reflected in the theology of Vatican II and subsequent theological reflection.
The modern, historically conscious worldview sees each thing as part of a whole which has yet to be discovered. Since life is an ongoing process of knowing more and more thinking in developmental terms is quite natural. The historically conscious view conceives the personas growing closer to the truth but not being so bold as to know the whole of it anywhere along the way. This point of view recognizes that all knowledge is conditioned by time and place, limited self—awareness, and limited grasps of reality. “Specific” “individual,” and “changing” are adjectives which characterize this point of view. Change, development, and revision are not sign of imperfection but ways of coming to the truth. This point of view believes that, although we come to possess truth slowly, we are not wandering aimlessly with nothing to give us direction. The truth can be grasped in some reliable way, allowing us to obtain a foothold in our journey before moving on to new discoveries.
Historically consciousness recognize that humanity is both a product and maker of history for this reason, historical consciousness requires that all statements of moral teaching be interpreted from within their context and for a new audience. Since it does not absolutize any one particular culture or one particular moment in history as having grasped the whole of truth, the modern worldview is not satisfied with the mere repetition of the formulations of another age for a new era with new people and new experiences. Historical consciousness employs an inductive method which takes seriously the diversity of human experience based on historical amid cultural differences. Since moral theology is reflecting on the lived experience of the Christian Community, it will inevitably be influenced by the very context in which it finds itself. As a result, its practical conclusions will also be colored by the limitations of historically and culturally conditioned experiences and expressions of value within that community. For this reason, it has greater difficulty than does the moral theology of the classicist worldview in reaching an absolute certitude which excludes the possibility of error even in specific complex instances.
The shift of worldviews has been reflected in the theology of the Documents of Vatican II and in subsequent theological reflection. The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, is an excellent example. It makes its call to “read the signs of the times” with some credibility because the document itself recognizes that “the human race has passed from a rather static concept of reality to a more dynamic evolutionary one.
The third shift behind the changes in moral theology is that of method. This has already been suggested by the shift in worldviews and logically from Contemporary theology’s method is reflected in Gaudium et Spes. Before taking its reading of the signs of the times in Part II, the documents states its method in an introductory paragraph saving that it is going to consider the urgent needs of the present age “in the light of the gospel and of human experience (n. 46). This statement tips the document s hand showing its favor for a more historically conscious, inductive method in theology.
What is this method like? The historically conscious worldview of contemporary moral theology supports a method that is empirical and inductive. This is not to say that deductive reasoning has no place in modern moral theology. It still does. But moral theology today is more likely to begin with historical particulars, the concrete, and the changing. It is reluctant to draw conclusions independently of a consideration of the human person and the complexities of human existence. This requires a greater concern for the developmental, personal­istic and social structural dimensions of lived experiences. In order to gain access to this experience, the social sciences must form an integral part of the reflect on complex moral issues.
One implication of the inductive method is that it requires moral theology to pay attention, in a critical way to contributions from the empirical sciences and from the testimony of people of good will. We cannot adequately arrive at a moral position apart from considering empirical data, the data of human experience. The very structure of the knowing process demands it. In moral matters, experience is a valid source of moral knowledge about the human good and a valid source for confirming moral judgments. This means that we ought to pay closer attention to the experience of the moral community and the consequences of what helps and what hinders the full development of human life in the process of formulating and interpreting our moral teaching.
Greater appeal to the empirical sciences and to the experience and testi­mony of people of good will affects the way we formulate new teachings and assess past ones. For example, some matters about which we have made unambiguous moral judgments in the past (such as masturbation, contracep­tion, sterilization, religious liberty, and usury) are now seen to be much more complex realities than previous formulations admitted. The appeal to empiri­cal data and the testimony of people of good will softens the severity of some of our formulations and weakens their claims for certain universal applica­tion. The inductive method is, in many ways, forcing us to bring the ancient and honorable prudential process to center stage.
Furthermore, an inductive method encourages the learning-teaching pro­cess of coming to truth. The conclusions of an inductive method do not claim to be absolutely certain and free from error. An inductive method accepts limitations of conclusions based on the possibility of limited evidence and insight. Mistakes are the way to fuller understanding. A dissenting opinion which comes at the end of careful deliberation and honest effort to appropri­ate the official position as valid becomes itself a new datum to be interpreted, evaluated, and appropriated for its kernel of truth. The inductive method assumes that its conclusions are, at best, tentative summaries of the present state of the question. An inductive method does not claim to solve a problem completely or to close a discussion. It always remains open to new experience and insight because it proposes its conclusions as identifying the war things appear to be at the present time.

B. Post Vatican II Developments
Vatican II did not issue a document on moral theology. However, themes within all the documents displayed a new approach to moral theology. The Council Fathers placed moral theology within the con­text of dogmatic theology and scripture, rather than canon law. Traditional perspectives on natural law theory yielded to more contemporary interpretations that would more ably serve the moral life of the church. Importance was given to the individual person, to responsibility and freedom. Individual conscience, where moral free­dom resides, was given due importance. To address the individual person, theologians had to address the context of the person’s life and its historical dimensions. No longer could one make a moral judgment based solely on an act, but one had also to consider inten­tion and circumstances. The renewal retrieved Aquinas’s three font principle of act, intention, and circumstances, which brought a bal­ance to the manualist mentality of previous eras that had focused primarily on the act isolated from the rest of a person’s life and history.
Vatican II shifted the direction for doing theology from a “top­down” or deductive approach to include a more inductive approach. Church members were treated as adults who are themselves primar­ily responsible for their moral life rather than making the parish priest responsible for parishioners’ moral decisions. Dialogue and learning with church authority were encouraged so adults could form their consciences and make mature moral decisions.
In the Decree on Priestly Formation, the Council asks the students in dogmatic theology should learn how mysteries of salvation “are interconnected and be taught recognize their presence and activity in liturgical actions the whole life of the Church. Let them learn of revelation, apply eternal truths to the changing conditions of human affairs and to communicate such truths in a manner suited to contem­porary man. Here dogmatic theology itself is given a orientation to life which precludes an artificial of theological disciplines.[26]
Council goes on to say that “other theological disciplines should also be renewed by livelier contact with the mystery of Christ and the history of salvation. Special attention needs ‘to be given to the development of moral theology. Its scientific exposition should be more thoroughly nourished by spiritual teaching. It should show the nobility of the Christian vocation of the faithful, and their obligation to the fruit in charity for the life of the world.”
In the light of these directions and other texts of Vatican II, we can trace the general lines of renewal of moral theology to the mind of the Council. Moral theology should be,[27] Theocentric. Not mere self-perfection, but the manifestation of the glory of God and sharing of His life is the goal of Christian life. The Christian is essentially the God of revelation who communicates to man. Morality is the response to God’s call out of love. The dialogal pattern of invitation-response should clearly appear.
Christocentric. The Council asks that the person Christ and our being—in—Christ be the center and focus of moral theology. Since it is in and through Christ that God invites man, it is only in and through Him that man can respond to this call. The consideration of man as man or the order of creation is not to be neglected. But this ‘natural law’ aspect must be seen only as a dimension of the fullness and richness of relationship of man-in-Christ with God. There is also the need of emphasizing the action of the indwelling Spirit of Christ with God. It is He who awakens in us the desire to be conformed to Christ and to discover the genuine ways of expressing our life in Christ.
Ecclesial. Christ is present to us and is acting in us today in and through the Church which is His visible extension. His salvific work is directed towards building up of His Mystical Body. Even at the secular level, the corporate destiny mankind is very much in the forefront of man preoccupation today. Hence it is all the more necessary that the communitarian dimension of Christian life be emphasized. We should go beyond a mere individualistic morality of isolated acts and concern for individual perfection to a vision of building up human community of which the church is called to be the leaven. The place of the Magisterium is guiding moral reflection must be understood in this context.
Biblical. Word of God is authoritative in matters of faith and morality which is the living out of the demands of faith. However, we must always be careful to discern whether a particular scriptural injunction is essential moral teaching normative for all times on relevant only for the particular situation or to a certain stage in salvation history.
Sacramental. In the past, much of the moral theology course was devoted to liturgical regulations and marriage law. While most of this matter is better transferred to other disciplines theology should develop the sacramental dimension Christian life. The sacraments are powerful signs by which we encounter God through Christ in His Church. The progressive sacramental incorporation into the ecclesial community brings about a gradual transformation into Christ. The gratuitous character of Christian sanctity as opposed to self-justification through the mere observance of the law will then be brought into focus. The aspect of worship should be given its central place in Christian living. The consciousness of the cultural character of the whole of moral life should be emphasized. The role of the laity as active participants in the worshipping community should bring out their role in the life of the Church.
Personalistic. Vatican II exalts the dignity of the human person, “subject and goal of all social institutions this points to the importance of the personal conscience and till need for developing the personal dimension of the moral law. The Personalistic and existentialist currents of mode thought are a help in presenting the basic Christian mo message provided one is not misled by its excesses. There is need for understanding the human person as a whole. “It remains each man’s duty to preserve a view of the who person, a view in which the values of the intellect, will, conscience and fraternity are pre-eminent.”’ Instead of dichotomy between body and soul, we must consider, according to biblical anthropology, the physical, psychic and spirit dimensions of man, both in their individual and social aspects. The social is not something added to man. The human person is essentially social. Today, especially, there is the n for emphasizing the social aspects of morality since the person finds his fulfillment in society and is impeded from attaining to perfection through adverse social factors.
Ecumenical. For a long time catholic and protestant moral thought had gone along separate paths. Now there is a rapprochement. The more scriptural and theocentric presenta­tion of reformed moral thought has already had its useful pact on catholic moral theology. Protestants, on the other hand, are rediscovering the importance of human values in Christian ethics. It is refreshing to note that many catholic and protestant writers are at home with each other’s thought. Slowly a consensus is growing on important issues, although the differences are still significant.
In moral theology, empha­sis on the person gives a different hue to moral decisions. Criteria for what is morally right or wrong must square with an anthro­pology of the person and with psychological and sociological data about humanity. Such criteria have to consider variables that were excluded in the totally objective criteria of casuistry. All aspects of the person impinge on a moral action. Along with the moral act, one’s culture, age, education, life experiences, and psychological state become relevant factors when one tries to make a moral decision. Bernard flaring took all of these factors into consideration when he stated, “One should never try to impose what the other person can­not sincerely internalize, except the case of preventing grave injustice toward a third person.” This contemporary moral theologian gives serious consideration to the situation of a person.[28]
During the time of post-Vatican II renewal, many moral theologians retrieved the tradition of Thomas Aquinas, which emphasized the person. The moral theologian Louis Janssens developed Personalist criteria that reflect the turn to the subject. Janssens states: “An action is morally right if it is beneficial to the person adequately con­sidered in himself or herself (i.e., as an unique, embodied spirit) and in his or her relations (i.e., to others, to social structures, to the ma­terial world, and to God).” The person and the context of a person’s life must be considered in making moral decisions.
The bishops of Vatican II emphasized the social and communal nature of the human person when, as noted earlier, they stated, “For by his innermost nature man is a social being, and unless he re­lates himself to others he can neither live nor develop his potential” (Gaudium et Spes 12). Moreover, as social beings, people learn to participate in the divine life, for they experience God in and through community. It is only through participation with each other that hu­mans participate in the divine life. While it is important to consider the good of the person, that good must also benefit the whole. A common good must be sought such that the individual and the com­munity both benefit. [29]
“Community” includes a person’s local parish or faith commu­nity, the official church, and all the groups in society that have a moral impact on that person, that is, family, neighbors, friends, busi­ness associates, and others. These groups are external to the person hut significant for the peace and well being of the individual. Whatever the “community,” it provides a place for the person to be and to establish identity and relationships. In terms of moral theology, the community furnishes the objective dimension of moral deci­sion making, an important balance to the subjective dimension the person brings to moral decisions. Community membership widens the individual’s perspective. It also foregrounds expectations of care and interest in the other members. The good of all must be con­sidered. The common good becomes a concrete experience when one is committed to membership in any community group. Toward this end, some communities establish criteria, standards, norms, and even laws to regulate membership, funds, and activities. Besides the establishment of expectations, communities can be supportive, en­couraging, inspiring, and helpful. The moral life based on faith can only exist within a faith community.
The turn to the subject in philosophy and literature certainly affected moral theology. Moral theology turned from an authority-grounded, law-oriented mode of morality to a mode that placed responsibility on the individual. In addition, the turn toward a dy­namic, rather than a static, view of history enabled the council to include various disciplines of study such as science, history, psy­chology, and others in formulating moral statements. Because of vast developments in knowledge, change was acknowledged and ex­pected, and church leaders largely avoided making definitive, static, and absolutist statements. Theological disciplines moved toward dialogue with each other, reversing a trend toward isolation and compart­mentalization. Interdisciplinary study was also pursued. Courses in psychology and religion, sociology and religion, environmental ethics, literature and religion, and world religions could be found on Catholic university curricula. Moral theology was particularly in­fluenced by dialogue and study with biblical scholars. Biblical ethics emerged as a new discipline of study.[30]
Vatican II encouraged moralists to expand their study of moral theol­ogy. They were mandated to include scripture as well as natural law as foundations for moral theology. Since the council, scriptural ethics and revisionist readings of moral theology have emerged in response to the mandates of the council bishops. Because it contains the re­vealed Word of God, scripture is the foundation stone upon which all moral teachings are built. Scholarly tools are being employed to understand scripture and the moral teachings of Jesus. While recent scholarship can easily critique how scripture was used in the past, scripture is nonetheless central to any study of moral theology today.[31]


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Curran, Charles E. Toward an American Catholic Moral Theology. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987.

Davis, Henry. Moral and Pastoral Theology, London/New York: Sheed & Ward. 1938.

Grisez, Germain. The Way of the Lord Jesus: Christian Moral Principles. Vol. 1 Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983.

Gula, Richard M. Reason informed by Faith: Foundations of Catholic Morality. New York: Paulist Press, 1989.

Jone, Heribert. Moral Theology. translated by Urban Adelman. Westminster: Newman Press, 1958.

Lattourelle, Rene and Fisichela, Rino (eds.). Dictionary of Fundamental Theology. New York: Crossroads, 1994.

Lemkuhl, Aug, “Moral Theology” in The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 15, Transcribed by D. Potter, Online Edition, 1999.

Lobo, George, Christian Living according to Vatican II: Moral Theology Today. Bangalore, India: Theological Publications, 1980.

Moser, Antonio and Leers, Bernardino. Moral Theology: Dead Ends and Alternatives. Translated by Paul Burns. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1990.

O’Connell, Timothy E. Principles of Catholic Morality. rev. ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1990.

Peschke, Charles. Christian Ethics. Vol. 2, India: Bangalore Theological Publications, 1975.

Poulin, Calvin. Preparing Pastoral Confession: Moral and Practical Guidelines. 2nd Edition. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1990.

Willems, Elizabeth. Understanding Catholic Morality. New York: Crossroads, 1997.

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[1] H. Davis, Moral and Pastoral Theology, (London/New York: Sheed & Ward, 1938) Vol. I, p. 2.
[2] C. Curran E. Toward an American Catholic Moral Theology. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987) p. 3.
[3] H. Jone, Moral Theology, translated by Urban Adelman (Westminster: Newman Press, 1958) p. 3.
[4] A. Lemkuhl, “Moral Theology” in The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 15, Transcribed by D. Potter, (Online Edition, 1999)
[5] C. Poulin, Preparing Pastoral Confession: Moral and Practical Guidelines, 2nd Ed. (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1990) p. 3.
[6] G. Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus. Vol. I: Christian Moral Principles. (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983) p. 7.
[7] C. Peschke, Christian Ethics, Vol. 2,(India: Bangalore Theological Publications, 1975) p. xv.
[8] A. Moser and B. Leers, Moral Theology: Dead Ends and Alternatives, trans. By P. Burns, (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1990) p. 5.
[9] R. Gula,. Reason informed by Faith: Foundations of Catholic Morality. (New York: Paulist Press, 1989) p. 6.
[10] C. Peschke, Christian Ethics, p. xv.
[11] J. Wicks, “Manualistic Theology” In R. Lattourelle and R. Fisichela (eds.), Dictionary of Fundamental Theology (New York: Crossroads, 1994), p. 1104.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] C. Peschke, Christian Ethics, p. xv.
[15] H. Davis, Moral and Pastoral Theology, p. 2. .
[16] R. Gula, Reason informed by Faith: Foundations of Catholic Morality, p. 6.
[17] Ibid.
[18] C. Peschke, Christian Ethics, p. 114.
[19] C.Peschke, Christian Ethics, p. 117.
[20] T. O’Connell, Principles of Catholic Morality, rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1990) p. 11.
[21] Ibid., p.14.
[22] Ibid., p.16.
[23] Ibid., p. 19.
[24] E. Willems, Understanding Catholic Morality, (New York: Crossroads, 1997), p.163-165.
[25] R. Gula, Reason informed by Faith, p.28-38.
[26] Ibid., p. 166.
[27] G. Lobo, Christian Living according to Vatican II: Moral Theology Today, (Bangalore, India: Theological Publications, 1980) p. 19-24.
[28] E. Willems, Understanding Catholic Morality, p. 167.
[29] Ibid., p. 168.
[30] Ibid., p. 169.
[31] Ibid., p. 170.

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